Indirect Convertibility and Quasi-futures Contracts: Two Non-operational Schemes for Automatic Stabilisation of the Price Level by Colin Rogers & Thomas K. Rymes
ISSN 1444 8866
Indirect convertibility and quasi-futures contracts:
two non-operational schemes for automatic
stabilisation the price level?





Indirect convertibility and quasi-futures contracts: two non-
operational schemes for automatic stabilisation the price
level?
C Rogers and T K Rymes
This paper examines two proposals for automatic stabilization of the price level based on
indirect convertibility and something called a ‘quasi futures contract’. These two schemes
represent attempts to render operational ideas implicit in the Black (1970) Fama (1980) and
Hall (1982) vision of the monetary system. Criticisms of the two schemes have been rejected
by their exponents. The paper clarifies the analytical issues at stake in this debate and
concludes that both schemes do suffer from fundamental flaws which would render them non-
operational. Hence, neither scheme offers an operational basis for a laissez faire banking
system or provides a workable alternative to current methods of stabilising the price level.
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Deregulation of financial systems, technological innovations and dissatisfaction in some
quarters with the perceived failings of ‘discretionary’ monetary policy have led to
increased interest in aspects of what can loosely be called a laissez faire approach to
banking and finance. One element in this coalition draws its inspiration from papers by
Fischer Black (1970) , Eugene Fama (1980 ) and Robert Hall (1982). The BFH scheme as
it is now known in the literature provided some inspiration for the so-called New
Monetary Economics and models of competitive cashless payments systems.
More recently the BFH set-up also provided the  inspiration for two schemes which are
intended to either put control of the price level on automatic pilot in a laissez faire
banking set-up or to eliminate the discretionary element in the current central bank
practice of price level or inflation targeting. These schemes rest on the concepts of
indirect convertibility and something called a ‘quasi futures  contract’ (QFC). The ideas
have been championed by Greenfield and Yeager  et al (1995), Coats (1994), Sumner
(1995) and Kevin Dowd (1994, 1995, 1996) in response to theoretical criticism of the
BFH scheme and as a means of rendering operational the  theoretical insights of the BFH
vision
1.
The idea of indirect convertibility has been around for a long time and was apparently
criticised by Wicksell (1919)
2. More recently Schnadt and Whittaker (1993) have argued
that indirect convertibility is ‘inoperable’. These criticisms are rejected by Greenfield,4
Woolsey and Yeager (1995) and Dowd (1996) but restated by Schnadt and Whittaker
(1995). By contrast to the long history of indirect convertibility the QFC appears to be a
recent invention by Dowd (1994) to which Cowen (1997) has raised  a series of telling
objections.
In this paper we  do two things. First, we assess the debate and  clarify some of the
ambiguity about the analytical issues at stake. We conclude that neither indirect
convertibility nor QFCs offer a feasible mechanism for stabilising the price level.
Examination reveals analytical flaws in both proposals. These flaws have, in our view,
been clearly exposed by Schandt and Whittaker (1993, 1995) and Cowen (1997)
3.
Second, and more fundamentally, we argue that it would be impossible in a sophisticated
financial system (including a laissez faire system) to control the quantity of money in the
manner required by the two schemes. Consequently, even if the flaws identified in the
literature were not present both proposals rely on a mythical interpretation of the naive
quantity theory of money
4. What both schemes have in common is the idea that the
quantity of money is something that can be controlled directly and that control of this
stock can be  rendered automatic in a fashion which ties down the price level and reduces
monetary disturbances to the real economy. Put simply, we argue that this objective is a
                                                                                                                                                
1 See Rogers and Rymes (1997) for a discussion of  the theoretical criticisms levelled at the BFH scheme.
2 Dowd (1996, p. 501) provides a brief history of the idea.
3 Cowen and Kroszner (1994, p. 87n14)) also accept the criticism of indirect convertibility but on somewhat
different grounds from those outlined in this paper.
4 Eichengreen  (1985, p. 3)  argues that theoretical models of the gold standard shed more light on the myth
of the gold standard than on historical reality. We would suggest that the myth of the gold standard
unearthed by Eichengreen has its parrallels in the quantity theory and monetarist literature.5
mirage;  the goal of an identifiable and controllable quantity of money is not attainable in
a sophisticated financial system. Somewhat paradoxically Fisher Black (1970) attempts to
stress the latter point.
The mechanics of convertibility.
To fix ideas this section will briefly sketch the difference between direct and indirect
convertibility and outline the limitations of the former which indirect convertibility is
intended to circumvent.
The gold standard is a well known example of direct convertibility under which
the Central Bank stands ready to convert notes and token coins into gold at a
predetermined price. The determination of the absolute price level then amounts to the
determination of the relative price of gold. As Barro (1979, p. 13) explains: “In this sense
the absolute price level becomes a determinate quantity that is amenable to usual supply
and demand analysis, as applied to such things as gold production and non-monetary uses
of gold”.
The logic of direct convertibility is straightforward but the limitations of the
mechanism have been well documented in the literature. For example, as a practical
matter conditions of gold supply do not approximate the perfectly competitive industry
assumed in theoretical models of the gold standard. Consequently gold supply volatility
generates price level volatility.  In addition, selection of the price of gold poses
insurmountable problems. World real income growth has far outstripped the value of
world stocks of monetary gold so selecting the Bank’s price of gold requires either a6
Bank’s price well above the current market price or a massive deflation of the current
price level. Hence Eichengreen (1985, pp. 28-29) concludes his survey of the debate on
the merits of the gold standard in the following terms: “Resurrecting the gold standard
would appear to involve significant costs, serious uncertainties, and dubious benefits.”
These difficulties do not seem to deter those exponents of  free banking who suggest gold
as a suitable monetary base.
5
The difficulties with direct convertibility into a single commodity have however
stimulated interest in indirect convertibility as a means of circumventing the problems
thrown up by the gold standard in particular and direct convertibility in general.  The
problems of direct convertibility into a single commodity arise largely as a result of
instability in the price of that commodity.  Indirect convertibility is an attempt to avoid
this source of instability by defining the base as a broad basket of commodities.  To avoid
the problems with storage that arise with this proposal (Banks cannot store and trade a
wide basket of commodities) convertibility is indirect via a third medium which may be
gold or some financial asset.
As indirect convertibility is less well known some terminology will help clarify
the mechanism. Following McCallum (1985) it is useful to distinguish between the
medium of exchange (MOE); the medium of redemption (MOR); the medium of account
(MOA), and the unit of account (UOA). Indirect convertibility  requires that the medium
of exchange (the MOE, eg  $ notes) be convertible on demand at a bank into some
medium of redemption (the MOR), which could be gold or some form of financial asset,
and that the redemption medium differ from the medium of account (the MOA). The
                                                
5 A mechanism based on direct convertibility into gold or a frozen monetary base is proposed by the7
latter would consist of a broadly defined bundle of commodities. The idea here is that the
broader the bundle the lower the probability that shocks would disturb the absolute price
of the bundle. Throughout, the unit of account (UOA) remains the $. Thus the UOA and
the MOA are quite distinct in this proposal. The MOA is a list of commodities while the
UOA is the $. The MOE may be a $bill or the equivalent book entry.
Dowd’s (1995) proposal for indirect convertibility runs as follows: Assume a ‘free’
banking system in which competitive banks issue title to $ holdings and practice indirect
convertibility. The $ remains the UOA and $ holdings the MOE; the MOR is gold and the
MOA is a broad based commodity bundle. That is, the MOA is a broad commodity
bundle defined so that 1 unit has a legal ‘par’ value equal to $1. If the unit of the
commodity bundle has a market price that differs from $1 then indirect convertibility
requires the banks to convert $ holdings into a sufficient quantity of the MOR so that, by
sale of the MOR in the market for $’s, individuals can purchase 1 unit of the commodity
bundle. Dowd then argues that deviation of the price of the commodity bundle from $1
will set in motion ‘arbitrage’ opportunities which will result in a return in the price of the
commodity bundle to $1
6.
Dowd argues that a rise in the market price of the commodity bundle above $1 would
open up an ‘arbitrage’ opportunity for $ holders to convert their $’s into sufficient
redemption medium (a quantity) at the bank to purchase the commodity bundle. A $1 bill
                                                                                                                                                
Austrian element among exponents of laissez faire banking. See for example, (Selgin and White, 1994).
6 We have ‘arbitrage’ in quotation marks because the analysis which follows reveals that there are no
arbitrage opportunities.8
can be converted at a bank for Pb$/Pmor$ units of the MOR. This quantity of MOR, it is
claimed,  can then be sold in the market for Pmor$(Pb$/Pmor$) = Pb$ (sufficient  $’s to
buy the commodity bundle). These operations cause a fall in the quantity of MOE which
in naive quantity theory fashion causes (with a lag?) a fall in the $ prices of commodities
in the bundle, restoring parity. The mechanism works in reverse when the $ price of the
commodity bundle falls below par.
Dowd’s scheme for automatic stabilisation of the price level therefore consists of two
elements: (i) an arbitrage incentive to engage in indirect convertibility and, (ii) changes in
the quantity of MOE which restore the price level to par in naive quantity theory fashion.
Why indirect convertibility fails and the paradox of indirect convertibility
Schnadt and Whittaker (1993; 214) are the latest advocates of what Woolsey (1987)
christened the ‘paradox of indirect convertibility’. The Schnadt-Whittaker critique of
indirect convertibility runs as follows.
Following Dowd, assume a ‘free’ banking system in which competitive banks issue title
to $ holdings and practice indirect convertibility. The $ remains the UOA and $ holdings
the MOE; the MOR is gold and the MOA is a commodity bundle
7. How do banks
implement indirect convertibility?
                                                
7 In their discussion of indirect convertibility Cowen and Croszner (1994, p. 80) suggest that traders post
prices in the commodity bundle (the MOA). This doesn’t strike us as a practical proposition.9
If the $-issuing banks are to practice indirect convertibility they need to monitor the
market price of the commodity bundle,  P b
M
$  relative to the market price of gold,  Pg
M
$ in
order to meet the commitment to convert $ holdings into an amount of gold sufficient to
purchase the commodity bundle at the market price of gold. Because gold is not the MOE
gold holdings (the quantity of MOR) must be re-sold for $ holdings to purchase the
commodity bundle.




$ = PP bb g $
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As the banks cannot make direct observations of  P bg because gold prices are only quoted
in dollars (the UOA) they must derive the commodity basket-gold cross-price from the
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where  P b
M
$  is the market price of the commodity bundle which may differ from the par
price,  P b$
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Expression (3) reveals the source of the ‘paradox of indirect convertibility ‘ because it
implies two prices for the MOR commodity (gold in this case) - the banks’ price,  P g
B
$ and
                                                
8  P b$
*  is the par price of the commodity bundle so expression (1) is simplified by setting the par price to
unity.10
the market price, P g
M
$ .  Schnadt and Whittaker (1993; 216) note that this price differential
is unsustainable: “With the bank selling gold at [ P g
B
$], no gold dealer is going to be
prepared to buy gold for some higher price. In the converse case, no gold dealer would be
prepared to sell gold at a lower price than the bank’s price. This obvious ‘law of one
price’ means that the market ‘price-takes’ the banks’ rate; market behaviour would ensure
that any difference between [ P g
B
$] and [P g
M




The process of price equalisation will therefore operate immediately in the gold market.
Schnadt and Whittaker (1993; 217) argue that the paradox will arise if the banks actually
attempt to open a wedge between the bank’s price and the market price. In that case the
gold price would fall (rise) without limit and banks would ultimately be forced to suspend
indirect convertibility. For example when,  P b
M
$  > 1 the redemption price of gold, P g
B
$,
must fall as the banks act to maintain expression (3). Banks’ adjust the quantity of MOR
on the basis of the existing market price for MOR. But in so doing they change the
market price of MOR and cut off the opportunity for holders of MOR to sell at the
existing price in the market. That is, when the banks reduce  P g
B
$ below  Pg
M
$  so as to
maintain their commitment to indirect convertibility the market determined gold price,
Pg
M
$  follows it (see Dowd’s explanation 1995; 77). Attempts by the banks to lower the11
redemption price of gold below the market price succeed only in driving both prices down
indefinitely. If  P b
M
$  < 1 the converse holds.
The proposed route to indirect convertibility breaks down because by contracting to
supply sufficient quantity of the redemption medium at the market price the banks are
simultaneously adjusting the implicit redemption price of gold to compensate for
observed changes in the $ price of the commodity basket. But when the banks do this the
law of one-price means that the market price of the MOR  must equal the banks’ price.
There is then no way the MOR acquired from the banks can be sold for sufficient $’s to









$ / P b
M
$  unless  P b
M
$ =1.
 For indirect convertibility to work a discrepancy must exist between the gold price at the
bank and the market price of gold. If that gap cannot appear then indirect convertibility is
not feasible and no such contract would be proposed. The paradox of indirect
convertibility arises because it is not possible to generate a wedge between the market
price of gold and the implicit bank price when the banks offer a contract to supply a
variable quantity of the MOR. Thus if the ‘law of one price’ operates, (which seems
inevitable) expression (3)  simply breaks down when disturbed from par suggesting that
the scheme is not feasible. Any attempt by the banks to generate this wedge is the source
of the pressure for the price of the MOR to explode. Agents with model-consistent12
expectations would see this from the outset and dump (hoard) the redemption medium.
What is more likely, the scheme would not be implemented.
Assessment of arguments in defence of indirect convertibility
Dowd (1995) and Greenfield, Woolsey and Yeager (1995) reject the ‘paradox’ argument
but on somewhat different grounds. Dowd argues that the model has a unique and stable
equilibrium and that the paradox argument has ‘serious problems’ while GWY seem to
argue that given the broad definition of the commodity bundle its $ price will never
deviate from par.  Agents with model consistent expectations expect it to remain at par
and therefore always  behave in a stabilising fashion.
Dowd argues, for the case where  P b
M
$  > 1, that the act of converting $ holdings into gold
will reduce the quantity of MOE sufficiently to ‘rapidly’ return the $ price of the
commodity bundle to par. He suggests that the paradox argument ignores the second arm
of the adjustment process- the effect of a changing quantity of MOE on the $ price of the
commodity bundle- and that it tacitly assumes that once  P b
M
$  ≠  1 it is sticky in returning
to par (Dowd, 1995; 79, fn’s 16 and 17).
A close inspection suggests that Dowd’s (1996, p. 302) defence of indirect convertibility
rests on two crucial assumptions: (1) he assumes that a wedge can exist between the
banks’ and the market price of the MOR, and/or (2) he tacitly assumes that the price of
the commodity bundle adjusts instantaneously  (‘rapidly’ is not good enough) back to par
once notes are surrendered for MOR at the banks. In particular he argues that the paradox13
argument ignores the consequences of changes in  the quantity of MOE on commodity
prices. The second arm of the adjustment process identified in section 1.
With regard to the first point, the crux of the paradox argument is that changes in the
quantity of MOE cannot occur. There is no way that indirect convertibility can produce a
change in the quantity of MOE because rational agents will recognise that they cannot
convert gold into sufficient MOE to purchase the commodity bundle. It is not possible in
a world of rational agents to create a wedge between the price of the MOR in the market
and at the banks. There is simply no way via indirect convertibility for agents to convert
$1 into more than $1. There are no so-called arbitrage profits to be made. This is the
Schandt and Whittaker point.
This conclusion follows no matter what the degree of deviation from par and has nothing
whatsoever to do with relative speeds of commodity price adjustment. Any shock that
results in  P b
M
$  ≠  1 renders the first arm of the adjustment mechanism non-operational.
The banks cannot meet the commitment to supply sufficient quantity of the MOR to
purchase the commodity bundle because the market price of gold adjusts immediately
they attempt to adjust the redemption value of gold.
All agents with model consistent expectations would know this so the gold price in the
market would adjust immediately without the need for any trades.  There is then no
mechanism for restoring par once it has been disturbed. If the market price of gold is
determined by the banks’ redemption price then $ holders cannot acquire sufficient $s to14
avoid the loss which results from the rise in the $ price of the commodity bundle. The
scheme simply cannot provide the mechanism through which the banks enable $ holders
with a means to purchase the commodity bundle once its $ price deviates from par. This
is the essence of the ‘paradox’ position. Consequently, on these grounds alone indirect
convertibility is not a feasible proposition;  banks would have no incentive to offer such
contracts and traders would have no incentive to act on them. Indirect convertibility
cannot then be used to put the money supply on automatic pilot. Contrary to Dowd’s
assertion the process cannot be classed as stable. Hence the doubts expressed by Selgin
and White (1994, p, 1741) about the viability of the BHF scheme are well founded
9.
Outside of the initial equilibrium or state used to define or state used to define the par
value of the commodity bundle indirect convertibility is simply not feasible. If banks
attempt to meet the contract the price of the MOR explodes.
Can Dowd’s position be salvaged by recourse to the second leg of the adjustment
mechanism? - the impact of changes in the quantity of MOE on the price of the
commodity bundle.  In this case the speed of adjustment of the price of the commodity
bundle is in fact crucial.  For Dowd’s argument about the second leg of the adjustment
process to go through the price of the commodity bundle must adjust back to par
immediately a (the correct?) quantity of the MOE is exchanged for MOR at the banks
(assuming that traders have an incentive to do this). Only if the price of the commodity
bundle adjusts immediately back to par will the conversion of $1 into $1 via indirect
                                                
9 Cowen and Kroszner (1994, ch. 3) also reject viability of the BFH scheme and support the Schandt and
Whittaker critique. They differ in their interpretation of the BFH scheme in that they suggest that traders
post ‘prices’ in terms of the commodity bundle rather than dollars, (Cowen and Kroszner, 1994, p. 80).15
convertibility put the trader in a position to buy the commodity bundle for the par value of
$1. Any degree of sluggishness in the speed of adjustment of the price of the commodity
bundle will mean that the traders’ $1 is insufficient to purchase the commodity bundle
and the scheme collapses.
Consequently we can conclude that Dowd’s defence of indirect convertibility  as an
operational scheme rests on one (or both) of two implausible conditions: (1) the belief
that it is possible to create a wedge between the market and bank prices for the MOR and
(2) that the price of the commodity bundle adjusts back to par immediately sufficient
quantity of MOE has been exchanged for MOR at the banks. As neither of Dowd’s
requirements are likely to be met in any application of the scheme it seems safe to
conclude that indirect convertibility is of theoretical interest only.
GWY(1995) propose two arguments in defence of indirect convertibility. First, they
suggest that the banks should use the market price of the MOR when calculating the
redemption price. Second, they argue that focussing on the price of the MOR is a red
herring. The real issue is the broad definition of the commodity bundle which means that
its price would not deviate from par. To believe otherwise is ‘unrealistic’ although
conceivable. The problem revealed by the paradox is thus of academic (theoretical?)
interest only; it is unlikely that the problem would actually arise. In short GWY appear to
argue that the $ price of the commodity bundle would not deviate from par so the paradox
would not arise.16
GWY’s first line if defence runs into the paradox problem. The banks have a contract to
supply sufficient gold at the market price  Pg
M
$  to purchase the commodity bundle at  P b
M
$ .
Start from a position where $1 =  Pg
M
$  for one ounce of gold.  If  a shock produces  P b
M
$  >
$1  then indirect convertibility requires that the banks must supply more than an ounce of
gold at the market price (assuming it has not changed). But that is formally equivalent to
saying that the banks’ redemption price of gold per ounce has fallen below the market
price per ounce and we are back with the paradox. There is no way out here.
The second line of defence appears to beg the question.  Schnadt and Whittaker (1995;
297) set out the issue clearly: “We all accept that if [indirect convertibility] is feasible, a
deviation from par of the currency price of the basket must initiate some process that
restores the par value, and the issuing bank must be able to maintain indirect
convertibility whilst this process runs its course. The position of GWY is that the system
is stable in this sense. Our position is that any such deviation would force abandonment
of indirect convertibility.”
In fact, GWY (1995) appear to be suggesting that defining the MOA as a broad
commodity bundle is sufficient to ensure that no deviation from par occurs. But  in that
case why bother with indirect convertibility? Indirect convertibility is redundant if the use
of a broad commodity standard itself ensures price stability. As a simple empirical matter
most commodity price indices seem to be anything but stable.17
Quasi futures contracts
A related scheme for automatically stabilising the price level has been proposed by Dowd
(1994, 1996)) and Sumner (1995). Although Sumner places his scheme in free banking
context the proposal does not rely on the existence of free banking for its implementation.
This section briefly outlines and assesses Dowd’s proposal. Attention is focussed on the
core analytical issues in what is meant to be a simple idea (Dowd, 1994).
The intention is for a credible quasi-futures contact scheme to replace monetary policy as
we now know it with a mechanism which puts control of the price level on automatic
pilot. However, Cowen (1997) has criticised the proposal arguing that it is almost
inevitable that traders would bankrupt any central bank (or competitive banks in a laissez
faire set up)  issuing such contracts! We concentrate on the latter issue in this note
acknowledging that additional issues are raised by the Dowd-Sumner scheme (See
Cowen, 1997, for a useful overview).
Mechanics of Quasi futures contracts
The key element in Dowd’s (1994, 1996, Ch. 14) proposal aimed at automatically
stabilising the value of some price index,  pt , eg., the RPI or CPI is that the central bank
should create a new financial instrument, called a quasi-futures contract (QFC),  and
commit itself to buy and sell this instrument periodically at a fixed price.18
The form of the contract is such that the purchaser makes a payment at time t when the
contract is made, at a contract price $ pt
c and the seller promises in return to make a
payment to the purchaser in the next period, t+1, contingent on the value of some
nominated price index,pt+ 1 on that date. The payment would include interest at the market
rate
10. The index-linked payment would be $() 1 1 + + rp tt.
11 The central bank then
undertakes to buy and sell contracts to keep the contract price, $p t
c, at a pre-announced
level. (Note that  pt  is an index number while $p t
c is a monetary value.) The present value
of the expected  profit from such an arrangement is given by:
Er p rp tt t t t
c [$( ) /( )] $
* 11 ++ − + (1)
where  Et  is the expectations operator based on information at time t and rt
* is an
appropriate discount rate.  Dowd argues that the two interest rates rt
*and  rt  are
approximately the same so that, ignoring risk premia for simplicity, the expected profit
from buying a contract will be zero:
Ep p tt t
c $$ + −≈ 1 0 (2)
Hence the equilibrium value of the expected future price index is simply:
Ep p tt t
c $$ + ≈ 1 (3)
Expression (3) is intended to represent an equilibrium outcome achieved by riskless
arbitrage. In addition it is intended to be a stable equilibrium so that any deviations will
                                                
10 If interest is not paid the expected value of the contract would depend on the nominal rate of interest
which would  adjust with inflationary expectations and the price level would not be tied down (Dowd, 1994,
p. 830).
11 The timing of the payment at the time of the contract distinguishes the quasi futures contract from a
standard futures contract when payment is made on maturity, (Dowd, 1994, fn. 1). Note in addition that the
contract is “cash settlement”.19
release corrective forces. Dowd (1994, p. 831) argues that: “In short, if (3) did not hold
for some reason, arbitrage operations would take place that would tend to restore it.”
The stabilising forces work as follows. Suppose that the expected value of the price
index, E$pt+ 1 , exceeded the contract price, $p t
c, at which the central bank has committed
itself to trade. Speculators would purchase the quasi futures contracts in anticipation of
making a profit as E$pt+ 1  > $p t
c. The value of the contract on expiry is equal to the value
of the spot index at that date so traders anticipate a windfall gain when the contract is
paid out on termination. The central bank would create the additional contracts to meet
the demand to keep their price from rising. (Note that the ability of the central bank to
create new contracts is central to the scheme and that traders must also be allowed the
same facility.) As a consequence the money supply would fall as speculators reduce their
base money holdings and increase their holdings of quasi futures contracts. The falling
base money supply will then, in a quantity theory world, cause expected future prices to
fall, ie., E$pt+ 1  would fall towards $ pt
c and the process would cease once approximate
equality was achieved. The converse holds when the expected value of the price index
falls below the contract price. In this case the bank buys quasi-futures contracts from
traders who must be allowed to go “short”. When the contract expires if the lower
expected price materialises those who have gone short will make a profit at the expense
of the central bank. Traders who  sold contracts at $p t
c, can close the contract at a lower
price with the bank at expiry of the contract.20
Assessment of quasi futures contracts
The QFC proposal like indirect convertibility would appear to be non operational. Cowen
(1997) raises some pertinent questions concerning the rather naive use of the quantity
theory and some technical issues that need to be addressed
12. Here we concentrate on the
naive use of the quantity theory.
Cowen (1997) raises some awkward questions about the operational feasibility of the
scheme the most obvious of which arise from the existence of lags between changes in
the money supply and changes on the CPI. The difficulties arises because the existence of
variable lags means that it is inevitable that there will be periods of time during which the
‘self-regulating’ money supply cannot influence the CPI. If contracts expire before the
change in the money supply can impact the CPI, traders may be exposed to unbounded
losses. In that case any ‘mistake’ by the central bank  may involve it in heavy losses. For
example, if, given the lags involved,  traders see that the CPI is going to come in below
target they will have an unbounded demand for short positions. The resultant change in
the money supply will have no impact on the CPI for the contract period (only later) and
traders will make an unbounded profit at the expense of the central bank.
To avoid the possibility of such losses the central bank would have to suspend trading in
contracts which applied to the period over which it could not influence the CPI. Cowen21
(1997) describes this scenario as allowing the central bank to ‘move last’
13. However, he
notes that such a step re-introduces discretion into a scheme that was motivated by the
view that discretionary central banks are untrustworthy. The automatic feature of the
proposal is lost as discretion re-enters. “CPI future targeting is motivated by the view that
price level and money supply rules do not work well, but we cannot have it both ways. If
such rules cannot halt discretion in normal circumstances they also cannot halt discretion
when CPI futures trading is suspended.” (Cowen, 1997, 282).
In short, Cowen argues that given the inevitable existence of variable lags, situations will
arise under the proposed schemes for CPI targeting that will involve the central bank in
losses. As these losses are potentially unbounded the scheme would collapse on first
occasion at which traders outguess the central bank.
Cowen’s critique of the scheme rests on the fact that the lags between changes in the
money supply and changes in the CPI are variable and unpredictable. Hence they cannot
be known by the central bank (or set of competitive banks) or the traders so ‘mistakes’ by
the central bank are inevitable. For this reason Dowd’s (1996, p. 362) claim that the
existence of lags only complicates but does not undermine the analysis must be rejected.
Dowd implicitly assumes that the lag lengths are known and does not address the
question of losses incurred by the central bank.
                                                                                                                                                
12  For example, Cowen  (1997, pp. 278-279) argues that if the scheme is successful no one can make a
profit so there is little incentive to  engage in the required trading!
13 Allowing the Bank to move last adds an additional complication. Traders are unlikely to trade a contract
with another party when the other party has the power to influence the outcome in its favour  (Cowen,
1997).22
QFC’s, indirect convertibility and the naive quantity theory of money
In addition to the feasibility constraints on indirect convertibility and the QFC scheme
they also suffer from the inherent limitation that has bedevilled the naive quantity theory
of money since its inception. Outside of the mythical model of the gold standard and the
current equally mythical models with exogenous money, the quantity of money in a
modern financial system cannot be controlled in naive quantity theory fashion. This
would be particularly evident in the laissez faire banking set-up imagined by Fischer
Black (1970).
Black (1987, p. 1) imagines a financial system in which commercial banks and other
financial institutions are free to offer and pay interest on a range of accounts on which no
reserve requirement applies and in which all payments are made by electronic transfer.
This system has both desirable and undesirable properties. The desirable property is that
the payments mechanism is very efficient.  The undesirable property is that the price level
is indeterminate. This is evident once it is realised that the  laissez faire world of
electronic banking imagined by Black (1970) is the modern equivalent of Wicksell’s
(1898) imaginary pure credit economy. In a world of pure inside money the concept of
exogenous money is not relevant.
Black appears to suggest this interpretation when he argues that in his imaginary  world
“... it would not be possible to give any reasonable definition of the quantity of money.
The payments mechanism in such a world would be very efficient, but money in the usual23
sense would not exist. Thus neither the quantity theory of money nor the liquidity
preference theory of money would be applicable”
14.
Although we have some misgivings about his reasons we believe Black is correct to
conclude that in such a world the quantity of money (a stock) is not a useful or relevant
concept. If the modern financial system is driven by technology and market forces
towards the state imagined by Wicksell and Black then it is futile to attempt to render the
money supply exogenous by some form of direct control. Practical attempts to render the
money supply exogenous would require a halt to technical progress and the imposition of
something like a strictly enforced regime of 100 per cent reserve banking. Monetary
history suggests that attempts to place quantitative constraints on the quantity of money
have always been undermined by market forces to reduce costs and improve the
efficiency of the payments system.
Hence, even if some means could be found to render both indirect convertibility and the
QFCs scheme operational, market forces would be at work to undermine attempts to
place quantitative controls on the quantity of money. In each of the scheme s assessed in
this paper, control of the price level is based on the notion that the quantity of the MOE
can be clearly defined and controlled.  The history of money suggests that this is simply
not possible. Attempts at quantitative control are not sustainable. Technological progress
                                                
14 If, by the usual sense, Black means money defined as currency and deposits this statement is surely
incorrect. In an electronic banking system deposits still exist. All that has happened when a system moves
from currency or cheques to electronic transfer is a change in the form of the payments system. See also
Rogers and Rymes (1997, ch. 19) for a discussion of Black’s vision.24
and market forces will undermine any attempt to identify and control the quantity of the
MOE.
To illustrate the nature of the problem consider the relationship between the MOE and
QFCs. In particular, traders are not permitted to use the QFC’s as the MOE. In other
words there is an implicit legal restriction in operation to differentiate the MOE from the
MOR and/or the QFC’s. Apart from the fact that this sits uneasily with a philosophy of
laissez faire, historical experience suggests that if successfully introduced, QFCs would
come to dominate the existing MOE and the money supply would become undefined once
again leaving the price level undetermined.  This is the age-old limitation of the quantity
theory as a mechanism to maintain price level stability.
For the quantity theory to work there must be a clearly defined quantity of the MOE and it
must be controllable.  The inherent flaw in the quantity theory is that it is not possible to
clearly delineate such a MOE. Schemes for automatic control of the price level which rely
on the naive quantity theory of money always flounder on this limitation.
As both direct and indirect convertibility are not feasible the only practical alternative to
price level control  is for central banks’ to use an interest rate instrument in an attempt to
hit a price level or inflation target. McCallum (1981) and Edey (1989, 1990) provide a
theoretical analysis of this approach. What is interesting is that inflation targeting
provides a feasible mechanism for control over the price level in a world which closely
approximates Black’s imaginary world of electronic banking. Is technological progress25
producing a monetary system in which influence over interest rates emerges as the only
instrument in a largely discretionary approach to monetary policy?
Conclusion
An evaluation of the schemes for indirect convertibility proposed by Dowd and GWY
suggest that they are not operational. Any attempt to implement them would cause the
price of the MOR to explode. This is the paradox of indirect convertibility identified by
Wicksell (1919).
The failure of the proposal occurs because both arms of the adjustment mechanism
required by indirect convertibility are not operational in real time. A deviation of the $
price of the commodity bundle from par automatically requires a wedge between the
banks’ redemption price of gold and the market price of gold. But in any sensible
economy no such wedge between the two prices can occur. Hence there is no inducement
for currency holders to convert currency into the MOR and back again into currency to
compensate for the rise in the currency price of the commodity bundle. The is no reason
why the quantity of MOE would change.
Dowd’s second arm of the adjustment mechanism would not come into play. Even if the
second arm could be brought into play it would require instantaneous adjustment of the
price level to neutralise the non-operational nature of the first leg. As instantaneous
adjustment of the price level is itself non-operational, indirect convertibility is simply not
operational.26
The GWY defence of indirect convertibility appears to concede the non-operational
nature of indirect convertibility by suggesting that a broad definition of the commodity
bundle is sufficient to ensure price level stability. The latter view places inordinate faith
in the law of large numbers and appears to abandon indirect convertibility and the
quantity theory of money.
In similar vein, schemes based on QFCs in the CPI are also intended to place the money
supply on automatic pilot. As such they are based on a naive quantity theory view of the
world. On closer inspection it turns out that these schemes would be prone to breakdown
because lags between money supply changes and changes in the CPI cannot be
eliminated. Variability in the lags is an acknowledged fact by exponents of the quantity
theory. The existence of variable lags means either that the banking system will be
inevitably exposed to unbounded losses or it must introduce an element of discretion by
suspending trading when changes in the money supply can no longer influence the CPI.
Consequently, proposals to combine QFCs  in the CPI with indirect convertibility as a
basis for laissez-faire banking as suggested by Dowd (1996a, p.367; 1996b) would seem
to combine a pot pouri of  non-operational elements. As a corollary, there is no reason to
believe that targeting CPI futures dominates the current discretionary practice of targeting
the spot CPI.27
Finally, even if these schemes were free of operational flaws they are based on the false
notion that a definite quantity of the MOE can be identified and controlled. Monetary
theory and history suggests otherwise.
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